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STEVE SHIFFRIN: FRIEND AND SCHOLAR
C. Edwin Baker*
Being able to contribute in this collaboration to honor Steve
Shiffrin is a great pleasure. Steve's significance to me has been great
both personally and professionally since we met 30 years ago at a
conference in Los Angeles. We appeared on the same panel, and
both later published our papers in both the conference book itself and
the UCLA Law Review.'
I assume that this is an occasion for offering amusing or maybe
embarrassing personal stories, but that is not my skill. I can turn
neither Steve's kindness in reacting to my mis-bids in the single time
he took me as a bridge partner in duplicate bridge in Ithaca, nor his
single-minded focus on making winning adjustments to his fantasy
baseball team while I waited outside a caf6 in Prague, into anything
interesting.
So I will limit myself to discussing Steve as a scholar. First, he
is an extraordinarily sharp, careful, but fair reader with the keenest
eye for weaknesses or inconsistencies. This quality is constantly
exhibited in Steve's reviews of judicial doctrine and is equally
present in his iconoclastic and telling critiques of the homilies that
fill constitutional, political, and philosophical discourses.
My experience with this trait is, however, more personal. In an
article in Northwestern University Law Review, Steve summarized
my views on commercial speech with a clarity that I wish I could
duplicate, and certainly with more accuracy than any other critic of
my views.2 I take Steve's care to be a true virtue, especially given
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1. CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1980); C.
Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978);
Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L.
REV 915 (1978). I thank Ron Collins for his central role in putting together both this and the
earlier conference and hence, among other things, bringing Steve and me together.
2. Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Awayfrom a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1239-45 (1983).
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how often a critic misrepresents my views or, as continually happens,
raises questions about my position without noticing that I had already
considered that precise question and answered it in the article the
critic was purportedly discussing. But Steve's clarity and care were
just for starters. He then proceeded to write what I believe is the best
and most powerful challenge to my First Amendment scholarship
currently available?
Second, but even more important, is Steve's development of his
own position. He is clearly one of the country's three or four top
First Amendment scholars, each of whom has different strengths.
Still, I consider Steve the best in terms of possibly the most
important criterion: being right about what really matters. On that
ground, his achievement is truly worthy of honor.
Steve tells us that romantics like Whitman and Emerson have
more to teach us about the First Amendment than Holmes and
Meiklejohn.4  Romance led Steve to identify protection of the
dissenter as the most important attribute of the First Amendment-
that is where the First Amendment makes a real difference. In any
pragmatic assessment, his emphasis on dissent compares favorably to
the views of theorists who emphasize the connection between free
speech and democracy, a marketplace of ideas, or individual
autonomy.
Robert Post, another of our great First Amendment theorists, has
been superb in grounding free speech theory in the American
commitment to democracy. A major problem with most political
speech theories, though not necessarily with Post's given his broad
conception of a public realm in which he argues restrictions are
impermissible, is that no one proposes suppressing speech that they
admit is actually political speech. For example, one reason Justice
Frankfurter accepted suppression of communists was that their
speech was not political, or at least so he apparently thought in
Dennis v. United States.5 But Steve's emphasis on the dissenter cuts
to the chase; few would argue that the communists were not
dissenting. The merit of his position is that people need protection
against offended or nervous majorities precisely when dissenting.
3. Id. at 1245-51.
4. STEVEN SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 74-85
(1990).
5. 341 U.S. 494, 546-47 (1951).
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The potential instrumental contributions that an ideally working
marketplace of ideas can make to a good society are immense.
Social engineers should aim at achieving these benefits.
Nevertheless, as Steve has shown, there is no reason to expect that an
unregulated marketplace of ideas will provide for this ideal, as
opposed to being hugely distorted in ways that lead to unwise results.
In contrast, his pragmatic theory of free speech shows the practical
contribution that dissent can make to improving major institutions
that, like those in all societies throughout historical periods, are
riddled with injustice.
I have argued that the legitimacy of the legal order requires the
government to respect an individual's freedom, and that this required
respect for the person as an autonomous agent, who makes her own
choices about her expression and her commitments, is the
foundational basis of the demand that government not abridge
freedom of speech. I will not argue against my own position, but I
must admit that dominant forces seldom abridge their own freedom.
The demand of respect for individual autonomy really matters in
precisely the context that Steve identifies as central: the context of
dissent.
Reminiscent of some the best arguments of utilitarians such as
John Stuart Mill and of people like Emerson-in this case Tom
Emerson, who described the role of free speech as maintaining a
proper balance between stability and change 6-- Steve described how
nourishing dissent can strengthen society and its institutions,
exposing areas where change is needed.7
The penultimate sentence of Steve's first book said: "If we play
our cards right, we can have social engineering and romance."8
Steve has admirably put both romance and his intellectual version of
social engineering to work in service of protecting dissent. Tonight I
can say that we too have played our cards right. Without dissent, we
have Steve with us to honor at this conference.
6. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
7. STEVEN SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999).
8. SHIFFRIN, supra note 4, at 169.
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